Much of the literature on international environmental agreements uses purely static models of transboundary or global pollution, despite the fact that the important problems to which this literature is addressed involve stock pollutants. The few papers that study IEAs in the context of dynamic models of stock pollutants do not allow for the possibility that membership of the IEA may change endogenously over time in response to the dynamics of the stock pollutant. In this paper we set up a very simple infinite-horizon version of the familiar Barrett (1994) model of an IEA, in which there is a stock pollutant, and unit costs of damage are an increasing function of the stock of pollution. Countries are symmetric and are limited to two actions (pollute or abate). We show that there exists a steady-state stock of pollution with corresponding steadystate IEA membership, and that if the initial stock of pollution is below (above) steady-state then membership of the IEA declines (rises) as the stock of pollution tends to steady-state. However, as the parameter linking unit damage costs to the stock of pollution increases, both initial and steady-state membership decline, and, in the limit, membership is small and constant over time. Of course it is for such parameter values that the gains from cooperation are greatest. These results are the dynamic generalisation of the familiar pessimistic results from this class of models of IEA membership.
Introduction.
There is now an extensive literature on international environmental agreements (see Barrett (2002) and Finus (2001) for excellent recent books summarising this literature). Yet, with a few exceptions discussed below, this literature works with simple static models of pollution despite the fact that many of the important problems (climate change, ozone depletion, acid rain) on which this literature seeks to shed light involve stock pollutants. In this paper we introduce a simple infinite-horizon model of a stock pollutant in which membership of an IEA changes over time as the stock of pollution varies.
There are a small number of papers which consider the formation of IEAs to deal with a stock pollutant. Rubio and Casino (2001) use the concept of self-enforcing IEAs familiar from the work of Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) but extend these models to allow for a stock pollutant. It is well-know that the static model generates pessimistic results, in which when a large number of countries join an IEA, the gains from the IEA are small. As in the static model, the dynamic model is analysed as a two-stage game. Countries first of all decide whether or not to join an IEA. Then countries choose their paths of emissions. These emission paths are calculated by solving a differential game in either open-loop or feedback strategies assuming that the IEA signatories act to maximise their joint welfare while nonsignatories just maximise individual welfare. Having solved for the emission paths and hence evaluated payoffs to signatories and non-signatories, Rubio and Casino then ask how many countries will want to join the IEA, using the same kind of stability analysis as in the static model. But in this model the dynamics of the stock pollutant affect only emissions strategies, not IEA membership. Many of the attempts to model empirically how many countries might join an IEA to deal with climate change have the same feature that countries are assumed to make a once-for-all decision whether to join an IEA, with the dynamics of the stock pollutant affecting only emissions paths and hence present-value payoffs (see, e.g. Eyckmans (2001) ).
Germain, Toint, Tulkens and de Zeeuw [GTTZ] (2002) extend the framework of Chander and Tulkens (1995) to a dynamic model of a stock pollutant. As is now well understood the Chander and Tulkens approach, based on core concepts, is able to obtain the more optimistic conclusion that the grand coalition will be formed, because they assume that if one country defects from the grand coalition all countries will revert to non-cooperative behaviour. This punishment is sufficiently severe to deter defections. By contrast the stability analysis of Barrett and others assumes that if one country leaves an IEA, the remaining members will act to optimise their joint interests. With asymmetric countries it is necessary to use income transfers to ensure the stability of the grand coalition. GTTZ (2002) extended this analysis by showing that it is possible to devise dynamic transfers to ensure stability of the grand coalition when there is a stock pollutant. The membership of the grand coalition is thus maintained over time, although in this case this is achieved by appropriate design of the transfers, rather than just by assuming that membership decisions are taken onceand-for-all.
Both Rubio and Casino and GTTZ analyse models in which an IEA operates over the whole life of a stock pollutant. Karp and Sacheti (1997) consider a two-period model of a stock pollutant but assume that an IEA will only form in one of the periodseither just in the first, because the IEA will fall apart at the end of one period, or in the second, because there may be substantial delays in forming an IEA. They then assess how the incentives to join an IEA 1 are affected by the dynamics of the stock pollutant, as well as by differences in the extent to which the pollutant is local or global and the extent to which planne rs discount the future. In Karp and Sacheti membership of the IEA varies sharply over time, but in a way that is exogenously imposed.
In an earlier paper (Rubio and Ulph (2002) ) we extended the model of self-enforcing IEAs found in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) , Barrett (1994) to a two-period model of a stock pollutant. We studied two ways in which IEA membership might be decided.
In the fixed membership model we followed Rubio and Casino and assumed that countries made a once-for-all decision at the outset whether or not to join an IEA. In the variable membership model we assumed that countries decided each period whether or not to join an IEA. We showed that in the variable membership case the number of countries would rise over time, and that for a wide range of parameter values, variable membership gave higher global welfare than fixed membership. So allowing membership to vary over time matters. In one version of the variable membership model there was an extreme case of the rising membership model in which no country would join in the first period, but some countries would join in the second period. This provided an explanation for one of the patterns of membership imposed exogenously by Karp and Sacheti. However, the two-period model had the undesirable characteristic that, even if unit damage costs are an increasing function of the stock of pollution, emissions generated in the second period were less damaging than emissions generated in the first period simply because its effects are felt for a shorter time horizon. It was this which drove the result that membership would rise over time. In this paper we extend the model of Rubio and Ulph (2002) to an infinite-horizon model, but we consider only the variable IEA membership case 2 . The model retains a number of the special simplifying features of Rubio and Ulph (2002) , in particular the assumption that countries are identical and that in each period countries have to make a discrete choice of emissions (pollute or abate). We first analyse the outcomes w hen all countries act non-cooperatively and when all countries act cooperatively. We then analyse IEAs where membership varies over time. We show that there exists a steady-state stock of pollution, which lies between the cooperative and non-cooperative steady-states, with a corresponding steady-state IEA membership. We show that membership is a decreasing function of the stock of pollution, so that if the initial stock of pollution lies below (above) the steady-state, then the membership will decline (rise) as the stock moves towards steady-state. The crucial parameters in this model are those which determine the level of unit damage costs and how quickly these costs rise with the stock of pollution. We show that as these parameters increase, both the initial and steady-state memberships decline, until, in the limit, membership is 2 in every time period. So for high values of these parameters membership dynamics disappear. Not surprisingly, it is for these parameter values that the potential gains from cooperation are greatest. These results are just the dynamic generalisation of the pessimistic static results.
The Model
There are N identical countries. Consider a typical period (we ignore time subscripts). Each country can choose a level of emissions q = 0,1, which we interpret to mean it can either abate or pollute. The total of emissions by all other countries is denoted by Q, so total emissions in the period are q + Q. Suppose at the start of the period the cumulative stock of emissions is z. Then the cumulative stock of emissions at the start of the next period is
) is the decay factor per period.
We denote the initial stock of emissions by 0 0 ≥ z .
If a country pollutes in the period it derives a unit of benefit which we shall normalise to1 and assume is constant over time. On the other hand, each unit of the stock of pollution at the start of the period generates for each country a unit of damage costs,
, which is a strictly increasing function of the stock of pollution at the start of the period. Thus the flow of net benefits to a country in the period is given by:
Finally, the discount factor per period is
In the rest of this section we consider what happens when all countries act noncooperatively, and when all countries act cooperatively. In the next section we analyse international environmental agreements.
Non-Cooperative Equilibrium.
Let U(z) be the present value of current and all future net benefits to a country when the stock of emissions at the start of the current period is z and in each period each country selects its optimal non-cooperative emission strategy. Then, in the current period a typ ical country takes as given the total emissions of all other countries, Q, and chooses its emission strategy q =0, 1 to maximise present value payoff:
Then it is straightforward to see that, for a given Q, z it pays a country to pollute if
We shall show shortly that U(z) is a strictly decreasing and concave function of z. So
(1) has the usual interpretation that it will pay a country to pollute if the instantaneous gain to it from a unit of emissions is greater than the reduction in present value future net benefits it will suffer from a unit increase in the stock of emissions. Given the properties of U(z) a sufficient condition for each country to pollute no matter what decisions other countries make is that (1) holds for N-1. We shall show shortly that, Then, the value function U is defined by the recursive equation:
Define z as the steady-state stock of pollution when countries act non-cooperatively.
, and, as we shall show in Assumption A, z z <
. From (2) we derive: 
. Finally, using the specific functional forms, we can rewrite (1) as:
As noted earlier, it is straightforward to see that, since c > 0, the RHS of (1') increases linearly in z, and so must fail to hold for large enough values of z. We define
If we ensure that condition (1') holds for z , then in the non-cooperative model it will always pay countries to pollute, since, by definition of z and the dynamics of the non-cooperative model, the stock of emissions can never lie above z . Substituting for values of b, c and defining:
Assumption A For the infinite horizon non-cooperative equilibrium with unit
, we assume that parameters satisfy the condition:
To summarise, in the non-cooperative equilibrium with unit damage costs
satisfy Assumption A, the optimal non-cooperative strategy is for all countries to pollute in all periods. Starting from initial stock of emissions, , 0 z the stock will rise (fall) monotonically to the s teady-state value z assuming that
. The present value of net benefits for each country is given by
where a, b, c are given in Result 1.
Cooperative Equilibrium
Now suppose that all countries cooperate and let V(z) be the present value of current and future benefits each country will receive if the stock of emissions at the start of the current period is z and in each period the countries collectively choose their optimal cooperative strategy. To determine this optimal strategy, suppose total current emissions of all other countries is Q. Then the optimal current period strategy for a particular country to maximise collective present value of net current and future net benefits will be to abate if:
We shall show shortly that V' < 0, so (3) has the obvious interpretation that it will be optimal for a country to abate if the current benefit it derives from emitting a unit of pollution is less than the present value loss imposed on all countries by increasing the stock of emissions by one unit. We shall show shortly, that provided parameters
. Then we get, trivially,
, the optimal cooperative strategy is for all countries to abate pollution in each period.
Given this optimal strategy, it is clear that the stock of emissions will decline to its steady-state value, 0, and that the value function is given by the recursive relation:
To get further we again assume the specific functional form for the unit damage cost
, and that the value function takes the quadratic form
Then (4) becomes:
Thus the value function is indeed quadratic, and equating coefficients we have:
Result 2 For the infinite-horizon cooperative equilibrium with unit damage cost
the value function takes the form
For these specific functional forms (3) becomes:
For this inequality to hold for all non-negative Q and z it is sufficient that it holds for Q = z = 0. Substituting for χ β , we need the following assumption on parameters to guarantee that (3') is satisfied.
Assumption B.
For the cooperative equilibrium with unit d amage cost
, satisfy the condition:
To summarise, in the cooperative equilibrium with unit damage costs z µ λ + , where µ λ, satisfy Assumption B, the optimal cooperative strategy is for all countries to abate in all periods. Starting from initial stock of emissions, , 0 z the stock will fall monotonically to the steady-state value 0. The present value of net benefits for each country is given by
Finally, to ensure that the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria have the properties set out above, we need to check that we can find parameter values that satisfy both Assumptions A and B, i.e.
Assumptions A and B are satisfied. For future reference, the way we shall select parameters µ λ, is to select 2 1 , θ θ as any two numbers lying strictly between 0 and 1.
Then we set:
International Environmental Agreements with Dynamic Membership
We now consider the formation of a seque nce of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), in which, in each period, countries are free to join or leave an IEA. The model of IEA formation in each period is a dynamic version of the model of self-enforcing or stable IEAs introduced in the work of Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) , and well surveyed in Finus (2001) . The model can be viewed as a two-stage game, in which countries first decide whether or not to join an IEA and then determine their emissions. In the second-stage emission game, non-signatory countries (whom we denote by the symbol f to mean free-rider or fringe country) choose emissions in a non-cooperative fashion similar to section 2.1; signatory countries (whom we denote by the symbol s) act in a cooperative fashion similar to 2.2, choosing emissions to maximise the total net benefits of all signatory countries, taking as given the behaviour of non-signatories. In the first-stage membership game we look for a stable IEA in which no individual signatory country would wish to switch to be a non-signatory, and no non-signatory would wish to switch to being a signatory. This is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium of the membership game. Before getting into detailed analysis we make three general remarks about our modelling strategy.
Firstly, the key difference between our model and the work of Barrett, Carraro and Sinsicalco et al is that we allow the membership to vary over time as the stock of emissions varies. Following Rubio and Ulph (2002) , in which we analyse a twoperiod version of this model, we call this a variable membership model. As we noted in the introduction, this contrasts with the way in which IEAs for a stock pollutant are modelled by, for example, Rubio and Casino (2001) where it is assumed that countries make a once-for-all decision at the outset whether or not to join an IEA. In
Rubio and Ulph (2002) Thirdly, since we have assumed all countries are identical all we can determine is the size of the stable IEA in each period. We cannot say which countries become signatories in any period. This leads to an important modelling assumption. For in conducting stability analysis we need to be able to assess how a decision by a country to change its status in one period (i.e. to switch from being a signatory to a nonsignatory or vice versa) affects its payoff not just in that current period but in future periods. The way a status change affects a country's future net benefits depends on two issues. First, a change of status in the current period will affect the stock of emissions in future periods, which will in turn affect the size of future IEA membership. We will take account of this. Second, future net benefits will also depend on whether the country contemplating a change of status in the current period will be a signatory or not in future periods. But as just noted, we have no way of determining which countries will be signatories or non-signatories. To get round this, we shall assume that in each period all countries ha ve an equal probability of being a signatory or non-signatory, which does not depend on whether it was a signatory or non-signatory in previous periods. Since the size of membership varies over time, obviously the probability of being a signatory in any period varies over time. So each country has the same expected present value of future net benefits, which will depend on the stock of emissions at the start of next period. non-signatories choose their optimal emission strategies; and (iv) in each period there is a random process for determining which countries become signatories or nonsignatories, with each country having an equal probability of being a signatory. We now turn to the analysis of the second stage emission game and then the analysis of the stable IEA.
Second-stage Emission Game
Suppose that in a period with initial stock of emissions z, the outcome of the firststage membership game is that there are n signatories to an IEA. We now need to derive the optimal emission strategies for non-signatories and signatories.
Non-Signatories
For a typical non-signatory country, suppose the total of current emissions of all other countries is Q. Then it will pay that non-signatory to pollute if
Not surprisingly this has the same form and interpretation as (1), except that there is a different value function.
Signatories
A typical signatory country will choose its emissions so as to maximise the total net benefits of the n signatories, recognising that all non-signatories will pollute.
Assuming all other signatories abate, it will pay any one signatory country to abate as long as:
Again, not surprisingly, (6) has the same form and interpretation as (3) except that there are only n countries who cooperate and there is a different value function.
We need to say more about the properties of
comparing (5) and (6) it is readily seen that 1 ) , 1 ( < z ω . It will be useful to
Define ) (z n as the value of n for which
Totally differentiating we obtain:
Lemma 1 For any z there is a unique positive value of n(z) > 1; moreover n(z) is a decreasing function of z.
Define m(z) as the smallest integer no less than n(z). Clearly m(z) ≥ 2. m(z) is the critical minimum size of IEA membership at which it just pays signatories to abate pollution. Then we have:
, the optimal strategies are for non-signatories to pollute and signatories to abate, and the resulting payoffs to signatories and non-signatories are:
(ii) For all n < m(z), the optimal strategies are for both non-signatories and signatories to pollute and the payoffs to signatories and non-signatories are:
Thus Result 3 tells us for any n, z what the optimal emission strategies and payoffs are for signatories and non-signatories. We can now go back to the first-stage game and determine the size of membership which constitutes a stable IEA.
First-stage Membership Game
In a period with initial stock of emissions z we define an IEA of size n as stable if it satisfies the 2 properties:
so no signatory has any incentive switch to being a non-signatory.
External Stability
) , 1 ( ) , ( z n W z n W s f + >
Then we have:

Result 4 If the initial emissions at the start of a period is z, then the unique stable
IEA in that period has membership m(z).
Proof:
We first show that m(z) is stable.
Internal Stability
From the definition and Result 3 we require:
So internal stability is satisfied.
External Stability
which is satisfied by (5).
Finally, proof of the External Stability condition shows that no n > m(z) can be internally stable. The fact that, from Result 3, for all n < m(z) payoffs to signatories and non-signatories are identical and independent of n means that no n < m(z) is externally stable. QED The intuition is simply that, as long as countries know that current membership is strictly greater than m(z) then defection by one country will mean that remaining signatories will continue to abate, so the incentive to defect is exactly the same as the incentive for a non-signatory to pollute, so as long as it pays non-signatories to pollute it must pay a country to leave any IEA larger than m(z). But once membership has reached m(z) any further defection by a single country would cause remaining signatories to pollute, and, by the definition of m(z), the cost of this outweighs any gain a single IEA member country would get from defecting and polluting. Finally for membership below m(z) countries are indifferent between joining or not joining, and our definition of external stability is that if they are indifferent they will join. Now that we have derived the size of the stable IEA and the optimal strategies for signatories and non-signatories, we can determine the payoffs to signatory and nonsignatory countries at the start of a period in which the initial stock of emissions is z as follows:
Then assuming that each country has the same probability m(z)/N of being selected as a signatory, the expected present-value of current and future net benefits when the initial stock of emissions is given by:
We can also define the steady-state stock of emissions by: Note that the result that the size of membership of the stable IEA falls as the stock of pollution rises is just the dynamic version of the result in Barrett (1994) that as damage costs rise (relative to the benefits of emissions) so the gains from cooperation rise, but conversely the number of countries joining the IEA falls. In Barrett's case that was a comparative statics result across different pollution problems. In our model it occurs endogenously as the accumulation of pollution drives up damage costs. The intuition for why this result occurs is that, as we have noted, free-riding means that the size of the stable IEA is the minimum size of IEA at which it just pays IEA members to abate pollution; as the damage costs from pollution rise, the minimum size of IEA at which it pays signatories to abate falls.
Particular Functional Forms
In order to be able to use (7) Then the condition for determining n(z) becomes:
Then we can solve (8) to get
The first approximation we make is to ignore the fact that membership must be an integer and work with n(z) not m(z). Then steady-state membership is defined as :
Straightforward manipulations allow us to solve (10), which is quadratic, to yield:
where:
Since ?, ? > 0, we have chosen the upper root of the quadratic in (10) to ensure that ẑ > 0. This also ensures that ẑ is unique.
The second approximation we make is to approximate n(z) by a quadratic expression:
where f, g, h are all positive. We choose f, g h so as to fit ) (z n to n(z) as follows:
<0; i.e. the value of n should coincide with the true value at the initial stock, 0 z , and at steadystate stock, ẑ ; moreover the slope of n should coincide with the true slope at steadystate. The values of f, g, h which satisfy these requirements are:
3 It is straightforward to see that (8) has two positive roots. We take the lower root because the upper root lies above N as long as
, which is a necessary condition for (6) to hold.
Note that by the properties of n(z) given in (9),
, guaranteeing that h is indeed positive.
We can now rewrite (7) as:
Substituting for X, collecting terms which have the same power of z, but ignoring terms which involve higher than quadratic powers of z (our third approximation) and equating the remaining coefficients yields:
Note that (14) is not a simple set of linear equations in A, B, C which can be solved in the way we did in section 2, because f, g, h are complicated non-linear functions of A, B, C through (9), (11), (12) and (13).
To make progress, we have resorted to numerical methods to solve (14). Starting from some initial set of values for A, B, C (which we take to be A = a, B = b, C = c, i.e. we start from the non-cooperative value function), we use (9) to solve for ) ( 0 0 z n n = .
Then from (11) and (12) we solve for ẑ , and from (9) we solve for
. This allows us to use (13) to solve for f, g, h. Finally we use (14) to determine a new set of values for A, B, C. We iterate until differences between old
and new values of A, B, C are negligible. We report the results in the next section.
Dynamics of the Stock and Membership.
To comp lete the description of the model with dynamic IEA membership, we describe how the stock of the pollutant, and hence membership, changes over time. The equation of motion for the stock is:
Now we know the following: (i) from (11) that there is a unique steady-state stock, ẑ ;
(ii) from (9) and footnote 3 that n(z) < N for all z = 0; (iii) 0
bounded below by 1. So the relationship between N -n(z) and (1 -?)z is shown in Figure 1 . Figure 1 It is clear from Figure 1 that if z z) ( 0 > < then the stock will steadily rise (fall) towards its steady state value and so membership will fall (rise) towards its steadystate value. Now the argument has been based on using n(z) rather than m(z) to denote membership, i.e. ignoring the fact that membership has to be an integer. This might lead to a situation where there is more than one steady-state membership and stock as shown in Figure 2 .
This suggests that if the initial stock is low (less than ) Again we simulate the model, but using the actual function n(z) computed from the equilibrium parameters A, B, C rather than the quadratic approximation ) (z n ; we also use the proper integer value for membership in each period, m(z). The simulation allows us to determine Tˆ, the time it takes the stock to reach steady-state. But it also allows us to compute directly the steady-state stock of pollution and steady-state membership, and to compare these with the values computed using the approximation. This allows us to check whether the simulated model converges to the same steady-stock and membership as predicted by the approximations, and hence provides a check whether there might be multiple steadystates, as discussed in the last section. In Table 1 In Table 1 Finally turning to dynamics, in all but the second case, the steady-state membership
given by simulating the model was identical to the steady-state membership computed directly using the approximations, with corresponding steady-state stocks being within 2% of each other. But in the second case the simulations produced a steadystate membership of 9 while the steady-state membership computed directly was only 8, with the steady-state stock being 420 rather than 410. We interpret this as an example of the possibility of multiple steady-states because of the integer nature of membership. But the differences between the steady-states are not large.
Conclusions.
In this paper we ha ve extended the familiar model of self-enforcing IEAs from the usual setting of a static pollution problem to a dynamic setting of a stock pollutant.
Unlike previous models, which assumed that countries make a once-for-all decision at the outset whether or not to join an IEA, we have explored the implications of allowing IEA membership to vary over time as the stock of pollution changes. We have shown that there will exist a steady-state stock of pollution (usually unique) and corresponding steady-state IEA membership, and that if the initial stock of pollution is below (above) the steady-state then the stock will rise (fall) steadily towards steadystate, and IEA membership will fall (rise) towards steady-state. The intuition behind these results is that they are simply the dynamic generalisation of the pessimistic static results that the greater are the costs of damage, and hence the greater the potential gains from cooperation, the smaller is the size of a self-enforcing IEA.
The model is extremely simple and there are many possible lines for further research.
One obvious question is how global welfare in this variable membership model would compare with global welfare in a fixed membership model. In our earlier two-period model we found that the variable membership model generally gave higher welfare than the fixed membership model. But in the two-period setting variable IEA membership rose over time and it would be interesting to know whether the welfare ranking of the two types of model would carry ove r to the infinite-horizon case. The model has also substantially simplified the emission choices for countries, and it would be interesting to know how our results would change if countries had a continuous choice of emissions.
Because of our assumption of symmetry, while we can determine how many countries might join an IEA at any date, we cannot determine which countries might join. So our modelling of the variable membership model of the IEA required us to specify what beliefs countries formed about whether or not they would be a signatory in future periods, and we have invoked a very simple assumption that each country believes that it has the same probability as any other country of being a signatory in a future period, independent of its past history of membership. This is clearly unsatisfactory and it would be desirable to either drop the symmetry assumption, and so try to determine which countries are likely to join in each period, or provide a proper justification for our assumption, and if that is not possible determine what might be a more appropriate assumption to make about beliefs.
Finally the model of self-enforcing agreements is itself a special model, and there are now a range of competing models of coalition stability (see Bloch (1997) and Finus (2001) for excellent surveys). Some of these models involve the concept of sequential formation of coalitions (so they allow for the possibility of more than one IEA group of countries). However the underlying game is static, and the notion of sequential formation is a conceptual rather temporal one. It would be interesting to consider how far such concepts could be integrated with the underlying dynamics of the pollution problem to assess how coalition structures might evolve in real time. Other Parameters: N = 50; d = 0.95; ? = 0.9; 0 z = 50.0; f =1.5.
